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BOOK REVIEW
Stanlis, Peter J., EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAW. Ann Arbor,
Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1958. 311 pp. $5.75.
It is not likely that the enduring value of this work can be inhibited
by Professor Stanlis's modest disclaimer that "There is little new in
the general thesis of this book." While it may be true that "sound
humanist and Christian scholars" have "correctly asumed that Burke
was essentially a Christian statesman and that his political convictions
conformed with the ethical norms of the Natural Law," the great and
singular merit of Professor Stanlis's work is that it incorporates such
earlier hints and intuitions into a full-scale, original analysis of the
Natural Law tradition as it operated throughout the corpus of Burke's
published (and, Professor Stanlis assures us, yet unpublished) works.
It is certainly true that Burke's more important nineteenth and
twentieth century critics saw him as an opponent of the Natural Law.
Burke's steady insistence upon the realities of any poltiical situation, his
refusal to throw over institutions in favor of "metaphysical natural
rights," were interpreted as prudential conservatism acting for the
greatest good for the greatest number. Thus John Morley, for instance,
labeled Burke a "liberal utilitarian." Other critics tended to follow
Morley, dismissing Burke's appeals to the Natural Law as mere rhe-
torical flourishes.
Professor Stanlis begins by tracing carefully the historical source
of the confusion of utilitarian and positivist scholars of the Morley
type. Besides what Professor Stanlis calls their "limited moral imagi-
nation," these men were the heirs of a philosophical confusion intro-
duced into English thought by Hobbes and sanctified- by the pious
compromises of John Locke. Far from understanding the Natural
Law as it was rightly understood by such thinkers as Cicero, St.
Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Blackstone, Burke's contem-
poraries and his later critics understood by the Natural Law some ap-
plication or development of the Hobbsian principle that natural law is
some "precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man
is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life." (Leviathan,
Chapter XIV)Professor Stanlis, in what is perhaps the most crucial
historical distinction of his book, summarizes brilliantly the results of
this confusion for eighteenth century and later thinkers: "Under the
influence of physical science, the conscious attacks of Hobbes and the
inept compromises of Locke, the eighteenth century was guilty, not of
the total destruction of the traditional Natural Law concepts, but of
a hopeless confusion [of the traditional Natural Law] with alien prin-
ciples and arbitrary claims made in its name. Similarly, nineteenth
and twentieth century critics failed "to distinguish between eighteenth-
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century "natural rights," which was a revolutionary doctrine, and the
still vital but submerged and partly deformed traditional conception
of the Natural Law."
Having established the traditional conception of the Natural Law,
Professor Stanlis next illustrates Burke's knowledge of it, and his ap-
plication of its principles to concrete political situations. A single ex-
ample of Professor Stanlis's method will serve to show the positive
contribution the book makes.
The appearance of Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France
(1790) was met with cries of indignation from pamphleteers and
liberals the world over. These critics read in Burke's stirring pages
an impassioned defense, for its own sake, of prejudice and tyranny.
John Morley, for example, felt that Burke saw the Revolution too
fixedly as a political rather than a social question:
"Burke did not yet see, and probably never saw, that one
key to the events which astonished and exasperated him, was
simply that the persons most urgently concerned had taken the
riddle which perplexed him into their own hands, and had in
fiery earnest set about their own deliverance."
But it was not that Burke opposed the Revolution because, as Morley
put it, the Revolution "could not be executed without disturbing the
natural course of things." Rather, he opposed it because it was a
gross moral oversimplification. For Burke, man's "natural rights"
did not proceed a priori from the hands of a "constitution-mongerer"
like Abb6 Sieyes who had "whole nests of pigeon-holes full of con-
stitutions ready made, ticketed, osrted, and numbered; suited to every
season and every fancy." (Burke, Letter to A Noble Lord) Man was
a political animal and for Burke, as Professor Stanlis puts it, "natural
rights . . . are a matter of practical political reason, and are to be
found only within the objectives and conventions of civil society."
Revolutionary theorists, Burke declared in the Reflections, "are so
taken up with their theories about the rights of man, that they have
totally forgotten his nature."
Society, for Burke, was not a disparate collection of individuals
ruling themselves according to their own emotions. Though society is
a contract, it is not a contract revocable at the whim of any group
of metaphysical, enthusiastic visionaries. Society is "a partnership
not only between those who are living, but between those who are
living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born," - such was
Burke's idea. In this conception of society, law was sacred, embody-
ing the civilization and the morality of a people. To break such a
contract was not only sinful but self-defeating. Professor Stanlis ex-
presses well Burke's position on the matter: "To Burke nothing was
stronger proof of individual depravity than an unwillingness or in-
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ability to live under the moral laws as that law was variously em-
bodied in man's inherited institutions." When man abandoned his
institutions in favor of his emotions, he placed government, inevitably,
in the hands of tyranny; he unwittingly started himself on a road
whose end was stark violence. Burke's warning about visionary the-
orists ending in violence is among the finest sentences of the Reflec-
tions: "In the groves of their academy, at the end of every vista, you
see nothing but the gallows."
Man, then, is born into a society willed by God and fixed in its
operations by natural law. Professor Stanlis's most valuable contribu-
tion, so far as practical politicians are concerned, might well be his
searching analysis of the manner in which Burke conceived that
changes might be made within such a conception of society. To begin
with, man should not, as did the French Revolutionary theorists,
throw over in any fit of adolescent pique every principle, every advance,
every act of charity that had received the santification of civil law.
He should operate - practically - by enshrining prudence. For Burke,
Professor Stanlis tells us, "prudence is the spirit of God's moral law
fulfilling itself throughout history." It is this principle of prudence
that makes Burke at once a liberal and a conservative. Changes in
society, Burke declares, must come about. But they come about by
conformance with what has gone before:
"By a constitutional policy working after the pattern of
nature, we receive, we hold, we transmit our government and
our privileges, in the same manner in which we enjoy and
transmit our property and our lives." (Burke, Reflections)
Professor Stanlis does not, of course, confine himself to Burke's
thought on the French Revolution. He analyzes also Burke's use of the
Natural Law as it relates to the Law of Nations, the relationship be-
tween Church and State, and the enigma of human nature. Finally,
the book demonstrates that "what was most remarkable in Burke was
the sustained consistency of the Natural Law in his thought and
career." Critics have always recognized Burke's practical Christian
charity; Professor Stanlis's analysis places him in an even more dis-
tinguished light. "The whole of Burke's political career," Professor
Stanlis declares, "is profoundly instructive in the moral wisdom of
Christian statesmanship." Further, "for a vast number of people,
therefore, Burke is a restorative of the Christian-humanist wisdom of
Europe, based on the Natural Law." Professor Stanlis's vigorous
closing chapter points up brilliantly what Thomas Gilby recently pointed
out:
"To break with tradition and erect a state on purely rational
principles is dangerous; and Burke's criticism of Jacobin doc-
trinaires has not been contradicted by the Hohenzollern Empire,
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the Nazi Reich, or the twentieth-century Russian experiment."
(Thomas Gilby, O.P., Between Community and Society, p. 221)
In conclusion, it is simple duty to remark upon the deep and un-
pretentious scholarship of this book. In no sense doctrinaire, parochial,
or partisan, Professor Stanlis's book is marked throughout by a spirited
clarity of style. Though the book abounds in passages which achieve
startling and effective compression without sacrifice of necessary mat-
ter, it would perhaps be best to close with a passage that illustrates not
only the book's compelling style, but its compelling thesis as well:
As a normative code of ethics, the Natural Law was the basis
of [Burke's] conservatism; it taught him that man and society
were organically immortal, and were bound through precedents
and conventions beyond history to God. The principle of pru-
dence underlay Burke's liberalism, his sensitive regard for men's
differences, his veneration of local loyalties and prejudices, his
intense dislike of arbitrary absolutism, and his skepticism of
ideal, simple, universal, and uniform plans of government.
Burke's acceptance of the Natural Law and principle of pru-
dence made his political philosophy thoroughly consistent, yet
almost wholly unsystematic. They, enabled him to fuse to the
limit of their valence the most sublime moral precepts and the
most concrete empirical facts, details, and situations, so that
"As a normative code of ethics, the Natural Law was the basis
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